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 Abstract 
 
Performance and behavior between domestic and foreign-owned banks are grounded in 
assumptions about the ability of parent banks to provide subsidiaries with capital and knowledge 
and to manage asymmetric information and agency problems in the parent-subsidiary 
relationship.  We complement research on internal capital markets and investigate how foreign 
owners of banks in emerging markets use their power to appoint executives at their subsidiaries 
to manage agency problems in the parent-subsidiary relationship. We find that perceived 
corruption and poor ICRG risk scores are associated with the appointment of parent-country 
executives as supervisors on behalf of the foreign owner. By contrast, a focus on retail clients, 
the absence of organizational routines and poor creditor rights are associated with the 
appointment of host-country executives. These bank and country characteristics create agency 
problems within the subsidiary, but not necessarily between the subsidiary and its parent. As 
such, they create a need for host-country executives’ superior knowledge of local markets and 
staff rather than for the supervisory role of parent-country executives.  
 
                                                 
*
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1. Introduction 
Over the last twenty years, banks from advanced economies have made large investments in 
emerging markets, both through greenfield entry and through acquisitions particularly in Latin 
America and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) (Claessens and Van Horen, 2012). A growing 
literature shows that foreign-owned banks in emerging markets tend to outperform domestically-
owned banks in both profitability and efficiency (e.g. Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 
2001, Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel, 2005b, Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel, 2005a, Micco, Panizza and 
Yanez, 2007, see Cull and Martínez Pería, 2010 for an overview). The superior performance of 
foreign-owned banks in emerging markets is attributed to preferential access to capital through 
their parents (Claessens, et al., 2001, Gormley, 2010), the quality of corporate governance (Buch, 
1997, Jotev, 2001), knowledge transfers from parents (Bogaard and Svejnar, 2012), and cherry 
picking the best clients (Claessens, et al., 2001, Detragiache, Tressel and Gupta, 2008). 
A related literature argues that foreign-owned banks have trouble collecting and 
processing soft information on borrowers, and therefore shy away from opaque borrowers such 
as small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs, Mian, 2006, Sengupta, 2007, Detragiache, et al., 
2008). However, the evidence on this claim is mixed. Several authors find that foreign ownership 
improves access to finance for small borrowers (Clarke, Cull, Martinez Peria and Sanchez, 2005, 
Giannetti and Ongena, 2009, Cull and Martínez Pería, 2010, De Haas, Ferreira and Taci, 2010). 
 Explanations for differences in performance and behavior between domestic and foreign-
owned banks are grounded in assumptions about the ability of parent banks to provide 
subsidiaries with capital and knowledge, and the ability to manage asymmetric information and 
agency problems in the parent-subsidiary relationship (Stein, 2002). However, while there is 
evidence on the workings of the internal capital market in multinational banks (De Haas and Van 
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Lelyveld, 2010), research on governance relationships between parent banks and their emerging 
market subsidiaries is, to the best of our knowledge, mostly limited to case studies (Majnoni, 
Shankar and Varhegyi, 2003, Simkuté, 2007, Szczesniák, 2007, Tóth, 2007). 
 In this paper, we investigate how foreign owners of banks in the CEE region appoint 
executives at their subsidiaries to manage the parent-subsidiary relationship. Following the 
literature on international banking, we use a principal-agent perspective to describe this 
relationship (Aghion and Tirole, 1997, Stein, 2002). We cast executives and especially parent-
country executives that are appointed at foreign subsidiaries as monitors on behalf of the foreign 
owner (Edstrom and Galbraith, 1977, Kobrin, 1988, Boyacigiller, 1990). Host-country 
executives by contrast, are expected to have a better understanding of local markets and 
institutions (Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991). The presence of host-country executives may 
improve the quality of information held by a subsidiary, but it will also increase information 
asymmetries between the subsidiary and the parent. Finally, we draw on the banking and law and 
finance literatures to identify institutions and bank strategies that affect the nature of the agency 
problem that multinational banks face. We exploit cross-country and time-series variation in 
institutions and strategies to understand how multinational banks use the appointment of 
executives to satisfy the need for monitoring and for local knowledge. 
 The empirical analysis is based on a unique new dataset with information on executives 
in 74 banks in fourteen CEE countries over a six-year period (2005 to 2010), which we hand-
collected from official bank websites and annual reports.  The data comprises 2,017 executive-
year observations in 340 bank-year cells. In addition to the executive’s name, age, nationality, 
and tenure in his/her current position, we also collected information on prior experience and 
education, including experience and education abroad. We also have extensive bank ownership 
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information, bank accounting information from the Bankscope database, and information on 
institutions from a variety of other sources. Finally, we were granted access to the Banking 
Environment and Performance Survey (BEPS) conducted by the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The BEPS contains information on strategies as well 
as perceptions of institutions. 
The empirical analysis shows that banks that focus on retail clients are more likely to 
appoint host-country executives, who understand the local environment. Similarly, banks that 
have not implemented routines such as credit scoring and give branch managers authority to 
approve relatively large loans are more likely to appoint host-country executives, who are better 
placed to deal with information asymmetries between managers and loan officers. 
Improvements in ICRG risk ratings, which measure the overall quality of institutions, are 
associated with the appointment of fewer parent-country executives. By contrast, better creditor 
rights are associated with the appointment of more parent-country executives. We argue that 
uncertainty about overall policy and perceived corruption cause information asymmetries 
between foreign owner and subsidiary. Better ICRG ratings are associated with a reduction of 
asymmetries and thus a lower need for monitoring by parent-country executives. Poor creditor 
rights by contrast, create information asymmetries within the subsidiary, but not necessarily 
between subsidiary and foreign owner. Creditor rights affect the uncertainty about individual 
borrowers, but not uncertainty about average default risk in the loan portfolio of a bank. Hence, 
weak creditor rights create a need for host-country executives’ local knowledge, while the 
foreign owner can manage agency problems by treating executives at the subsidiary as delegated 
monitors (Diamond, 1984). 
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Our main results are robust to a variety of specifications and hold for incumbent 
executives as well as for new appointments. In addition, we show that the results hold when we 
redefine nationality to include “hybrid” host-country nationals with foreign work or educational 
experience (Thomsen, Alexandra, Randoy and Oxelheim, 2011). We find that when demand for 
parent-country nationals increases, so does the demand for hybrid host-country nationals. 
Our paper complements research on internal capital markets within multinational banks. 
In a recent paper, De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2010) show that multinational banks use the 
allocation of capital both to facilitate lending by subsidiaries if host-country economic conditions 
are favorable and to constrain lending when the opportunity cost of lending increases. However, 
the internal capital market is only one among several mechanisms through which multinational 
banks govern their foreign subsidiaries (De Haas and Naaborg, 2006). Here, we focus on the 
appointment of executives as a governance mechanism and investigate how banks use these 
appointments to manage and mitigate agency problems between them and their emerging market 
subsidiaries. 
Our work also complements research on the impact of hierarchical decision making on 
lending behavior (Stein, 2002, Degryse, Laeven and Ongena, 2009, Liberti and Mian, 2009). 
Specifically, we show that institutional and organizational characteristics that cause agency 
problems within a bank need not create agency problems between a bank and its owner. Further 
research should determine if this can explain the divergence in findings about the role of foreign-
owned banks in retail lending (Mian, 2006, De Haas, et al., 2010). 
Finally, we contribute to the literature on the appointment of expatriates in foreign 
subsidiaries (i.e. parent-country executives). Within this literature, we focus on the role of 
parent-country executives in knowledge transfer and control on behalf of headquarters (Franko, 
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1973, Edstrom and Galbraith, 1977, Prahalad and Doz, 1981, Egelhoff, 1984, Black and 
Gregersen, 1999, Wang, Tong and Koh, 2004). Our principal contribution to this literature is in 
our consideration of the interaction between the appointment of parent-country executives, 
subsidiary strategies, and institutions in the host country (Collings, Scullion and Dowling, 2009). 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the theoretical 
background and develop our hypotheses. Section 3 presents data and methods and section 4 the 
empirical results. We discuss the results and present conclusions in section 5. 
 
2. Background and hypotheses 
Theoretical models of international banking tend to assume that foreign-owned banks are less 
well-informed about the creditworthiness of borrowers than domestically-owned banks 
(Sengupta, 2007, Detragiache, et al., 2008, Gormley, 2010). This assumption is motivated in 
more general models of agency problems in hierarchical organizations (Aghion and Tirole, 1997, 
Scharfstein and Stein, 2000, Stein, 2002). In these models, agents evaluate projects and 
communicate the results to a principal who can verify some, but not all the information about the 
project that the agent provides. Depending on his or her assessment and the allocation of decision 
making authority, the principal may decide to overrule the agent. In turn, the possibility that an 
agent is overruled reduces incentives to collect information, especially when that information is 
non-verifiable (Aghion and Tirole, 1997, Stein, 2002). 
In line with these models, research shows that, as the hierarchical distance between loan 
officers and decision makers grows, non-verifiable “soft” information is used less in decision 
making (Liberti and Mian, 2009). Similarly, there is evidence that geographic and cultural 
distance between foreign owners and their banking subsidiaries leads the subsidiaries to shift 
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lending to transparent borrowers and those about whom little information is available (Mian, 
2006, Berger, Klapper, Martinez Peria and Zaidi, 2008).  
In spite of informational disadvantages, foreign-owned banks can compete with 
domestically owned banks as long as they have a sufficiently low cost of capital (Sengupta, 
2007, Gormley, 2010). Consequently, De Haas, et al. (2010) show that foreign-owned banks 
expand their lending relative to domestically-owned banks when there is a crisis in the host 
country, i.e. when the cost of capital increases for domestic banks.  
 
The role of parent country executives 
We investigate how foreign owners use the power to appoint executives at their subsidiaries to 
manage the parent-subsidiary relationship. In doing so, we focus on the executive board as the 
primary interface in the relationship between owner and subsidiary. Below the board-level, 
subsidiary staff is overwhelmingly from the host-country and it is at the board-level that foreign 
owners can appoint parent-country executives as supervisors (Edstrom and Galbraith, 1977, 
Kobrin, 1988, Boyacigiller, 1990).
1
 A second role of parent-country executives is to facilitate 
knowledge transfer between parent and subsidiary (Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000). Owners 
need to balance their desire for oversight and knowledge transfer with the need for insight into 
the local market that host-country executives provide (Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991). 
 The balance between oversight and insight shifts with the local institutional environment 
and with the strategy of the bank. We exploit variation in these variables to better understand the 
way in which banks use executive appointments to manage agency relationships. 
                                                 
1
 As long as the foreign owner is the major or even the only shareholder, supervisory boards also act on behalf of the 
foreign owner. However, supervisory boards meet irregularly and thus provide less direct oversight than executives. 
Moreover, from an empirical point of view, a scan of the composition of executive boards suggests that variation in 
their composition is driven by legal considerations (e.g. the requirement to have worker representation) rather than 
by the owner’s concern about principal-agent relationships which is the focus of our investigation. 
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 The law and finance literature identifies a variety of institutions that affect banks. In this 
regard, the literature has focused on creditor rights, legal arrangements that facilitate legal action 
to enforce a claim against a borrower, reduce uncertainty about credit risk.  Strong creditor rights 
make it less likely that a borrower stops paying without reason and enables banks to make good 
predictions of loss following default (Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer, 2007, Haselmann, Pistor 
and Vig, 2010). Hence, creditor rights lessen the need to rely on soft information to estimate 
borrower risk. More generally, better institutions such as a stronger rule of law or better control 
of corruption reduce the need for hands-on monitoring by parent-country executives. This 
produces the first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Bank subsidiaries operating in a strong institutional environment are less 
likely to have (have fewer) parent-country executives. 
A caveat to this hypothesis is that host-country executives are better able to cope with weak 
institutions. In particular, they may be better able to anticipate actions of unpredictable 
politicians and regulators or to negotiate a settlement with borrowers when legal recourse is 
unavailable (Zaheer and Mosakowski, 1997, Mian, 2006). However, the same local connections 
that give host-country executives access to information also make them susceptible to pressure 
from politicians or executives of local companies or even to corruption.  
 
Strategy and parent-country executives 
In addition to institutions, bank strategies determine the severity of principal-agent problems 
within multinational banks, the need for a good understanding of local markets and thus the 
choice of executive. For the purposes of this paper, we define strategy in terms of (i) client 
orientation and (ii) the existence of organizational arrangements that reduce agency problems. 
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 One of the remarkable aspects of the surge in foreign ownership of banks has been the 
fact that foreigners have acquired banks with large branch networks and a focus on consumers 
and small and medium enterprises (Guillén and Tschoegl, 2000). Banks with such a retail-
oriented strategy need a good understanding of the local banking market as well as the labor 
market; retail banking is labor intensive. We therefore anticipate that these banks are more likely 
to appoint host-country executives. 
 An additional reason to expect that a retail focus is associated with the appointment of 
home country executives is that the opacity of retail clients causes agency problems within a 
subsidiary (i.e. between loan officers and local managers), but not necessarily between a 
subsidiary and its foreign parent. An individual consumer or SME borrower may be opaque, but 
the risk on a portfolio of loans to such borrowers need not be difficult to assess (Diamond, 1984). 
To the extent that the risk on the portfolio is a function of national, regional, and sector-level 
economic development, both ex ante and ex post information on the risks are reasonably hard. 
This leads to the second hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: Foreign-owned banks with a strong focus on retail clients are less likely to 
have (have fewer) parent-country executives. 
Just like restrictions on certain types of lending and monitoring can be used to address agency 
problems, banks can also develop organizational routines that help reduce principal-agent 
problems. Routines or “standard operating procedures” alleviate agency problems in the sense 
that they prescribe the way in which agents perform their duties (Nelson and Winter, 1982). In 
the banking context, credit scoring is an example of a routine. Loan officers are required to make 
a credit assessment based on a pre-specified set of variables. As such, credit scores “harden” 
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information on borrowers (Stein, 2002) and limit information asymmetries between loan officers 
and their superiors (Berger, Frame and Miller, 2005).
2
 
 Routines reduce the need for “local” information and thus the need for local executives. 
In emerging markets moreover, the development of credit scoring and other routines requires 
knowledge transfers that can be facilitated by parent-country executives. Hence: 
Hypothesis 3: Foreign-owned banks that rely on routines are more likely to have (have 
more) parent-country executives. 
 
3. Data and methods 
The empirical analysis relies on data from 74 foreign-owned banks over the years 2005 to 2010 
from thirteen countries in the CEE region (Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine). 
The countries in this region have experienced a significant increase in foreign ownership of 
banks since the middle of the nineties. Over the same period, most of the countries have 
implemented significant institutional reforms, some faster than others (Cottarelli, Dell'Ariccia 
and Vladkova-Hollar, 2005, Beck and Laeven, 2006). As a result, the region now has a diverse 
landscape of institutions and foreign-owned banks that comprises international network banks 
such as Citibank, pan-European banks like the Unicredit group, and several Austrian banks that 
took their first steps abroad when the markets in neighboring CEE countries opened up. 
 
Executives 
                                                 
2
 Strictly speaking, limits on lending to opaque clients are also routines and poorly designed credit scoring systems 
may well have the effect of reducing the availability of credit to consumers and small and medium enterprises. 
However, the goal of credit scoring is to improve the quality of information on borrowers and if done well, it can 
expand access to credit (Petersen and Rajan, 2002, Berger, et al., 2005). 
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Data on bank executives is not readily available in database format and we hand-collected 
comprehensive data on the executives of the banks in our dataset. The dataset comprises 686 
executives with a total of 2,014 executive-year entries from 340 bank years. In addition to the 
names, gender, and nationalities of executives, we collect information on their age, tenure at their 
current bank, prior experience, and education. We are especially interested in foreign experience 
and education. Host-country executives who have worked or studied abroad are likely to be more 
apt to communicate with headquarters. The main sources of data are bank websites and annual 
reports. To fill in missing information, we also looked up profiles of executives on a limited 
number of reputable websites such as Bloomberg BusinessWeek. 
 Table 1 gives an overview of executive by nationality and by executive function. Overall, 
37 % of executive-year observations are from parent-country nationals, while 165 out of 356 (46 
%) of executives that are newly appointed during our sample period are from parent countries. 
Our definition of parent-country executives includes so-called “third-country” nationals who 
come from neither the parent nor the host country. Most third-country nationals have experience 
at the parent bank. It is our understanding from informal discussions with banks that third-
country nationals are considered part of the international staff and are expected to move to 
different positions within the multinational network of the bank or back to headquarters. Within 
our theoretical framework, it therefore makes sense to treat them as parent-country nationals.
3
 
Based on the information available from the banks, we divided the executives by 
functional area. The functional split in Table 1 reveals an interesting pattern. Along with Deputy 
CEOs, executives with responsibilities for financial and risk management are most likely to be 
parent-country nationals. However, a large majority of executives responsible for sales and client 
                                                 
3
 In an exception to the third-country rule, we treat executives from Slovakia that work in the Czech Republic and 
vice versa as well as executives from the former Yugoslav republics (Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia) that work in 
one of these countries a host-country nationals.  
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relations or for internal operations are host country nationals. In and of itself, the distinction 
between these functions point to the different strengths of host- and parent-country nationals. 
The sales and operations functions (which include human resources) involve relations with host-
country clients and staff and put a premium on familiarity with local markets and culture. By 
contrast, having a parent-country national in the finance and risk function facilitates monitoring 
from headquarters. 
 We summarize executive characteristics in Table 2. On average, the executives in our 
database are males in their mid-forties, with parent-country executives slightly older and more 
likely to be male than their host-country counterparts. Host-country executives are more likely to 
have at least a master’s degree, but they are less likely than parent-country nationals to have 
foreign work experience or a foreign education.
4
 Finally, parent-country nationals have a shorter 
tenure at both the subsidiary and in the board than their home-country counterparts but, 
unsurprisingly, a longer tenure at the parent company. 
 Aside from information on bank executives, our dataset contains subsidiary-level 
accounting data from Bureau van Dijk’s Bankscope database. In addition, we were granted 
access to the Bank Environment and Performance Survey (BEPS) that was held by the EBRD in 
2004. The BEPS asked bank executives in the CEE region a wide range of question on bank 
strategy and their perception of the local business environment. Finally, we use country-level 
data from a variety of sources including the World Bank and the annual International Country 
Risk Guide. 
 
Empirical Strategy 
                                                 
4
 Foreign experience does not include experience an executive’s current position. 
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In our baseline model, we estimate the likelihood that an executive is from the parent country as 
a function of a measure of institutional quality (hypothesis 1) or bank strategy (hypotheses 2 and 
3) and a number of control variables: 
 
( , , ,
)
ijkt jkt ijkt jkt
kt ijkt
Parent Country Executive f X ExecutiveControls Bank Controls
CountryControls 


  (1) 
In equation (1), the subscript i identifies an executive, j identifies the bank, k the country and t 
the year. The institutional and strategic variables of interest are represented by X. We use a linear 
probability model in most of the estimations that we present in this paper. However, we also 
estimate a logit specification of the model to check the robustness of our results. The error term, 
εijkt has a zero mean and we cluster the errors to allow for correlation of the errors within banks.
5
 
In estimating equation (1), we treat bank characteristics and in particular bank strategies 
as pre-determined. That is, we implicitly assume that the strategy guides the choice of executives 
rather than the other way around; insofar as executives shape bank strategies, they do so as 
representatives of the parent banks, not as independent actors. We are comfortable with this 
assumption because, by the mid-2000s the majority of foreign owners of banks in Eastern 
Europe had well-developed strategies to establish their presence on the markets for banking 
services in the CEE region.
6
  
 
Variables 
                                                 
5
 Ideally, we would cluster the errors at the country level because that is the level at which institutions are measured  
(Moulton, 1990). However, with only thirteen countries and an unbalanced distribution of observations across 
countries, it is not feasible to estimate clustered standard errors at that level (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 
2004). 
6
 Tschoegl (2005) describes a subset of the foreign investors banks in the CEE region and other emerging markets as 
bettors, prospectors and restructurers. The first two types take a backseat or wait-and-see approach in the 
management of the banks they invested in, while the restructurers take an active role with the objective to improve 
performance. By 2004, most investors in CEE banks that can be described as bettors or prospectors had sold out or 
turned into restructurers. 
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The dependent variable Parent Country Executive is generally a dummy that is equal to 1 if an 
executive is from the parent country or from a third country. In an alternative specification, we 
create a categorical variable that allows for “hybrid” nationalities on the basis of international 
experience (Thomsen, et al., 2011 see Table 6). The variable is higher for host-country nationals 
with education or work experience abroad than for host-country nationals without such 
experience. It is highest for parent-country executives. 
 We use three different types of measures for institutions. First, the BEPS survey asks 
whether bribery is common in the courts or among regulators. We take the country-level 
averages of these answers as an indicator of the perceived level of corruption among regulators 
and in the courts. We expect this corruption to be associated with the appointment of parent-
country nationals because it increases the need for supervision of host-country staff and increases 
the level of uncertainty about the business prospects for banks. Second, we use the ICRG 
composite country risk index as well as the ICRG measure for bureaucratic quality as measures 
of the general strength of the institutional and regulatory framework in a country.
7
 Again, we 
expect that higher risk (lower ICRG score) is associated with more parent-country executives. 
Finally, we use two measures from the World Bank’s Doing Business database8 to measure the 
quality of credit market institutions. The first measure is the creditor rights index, which is 
higher if a country has better legal arrangements to deal with collateral and bankruptcy. The 
second measure is the creditor information index, which is higher if credit bureaus have more 
extensive coverage of the credit histories of borrowers. Both creditor rights and creditor 
information reduce the need to rely on soft information in lending decisions and facilitate ex ante 
assessments of borrower risk. We expect that higher scores are associated with fewer 
                                                 
7
 http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG.aspx 
8
 www.doingbusiness.org 
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appointments of parent-country executives. Table 3 provides summary statistics on the 
institutional as well as the other variables. 
 In order to test hypothesis 2, we rely on the BEPS as well as on accounting data to 
measure banks’ orientation towards retail clients. First, the BEPS survey asks banks what share 
of their lending goes to and what share of deposits comes from households. The benefit of these 
measures that it they are clean indicators of a bank’s focus on retail clients. The drawback is that 
the measures are only available at the beginning of the sample in 2004 when the BEPS survey 
was held. Therefore, we use the Bankscope data to calculate the ratio of demand deposits to 
loans. This is an indirect measure of the retail focus of banks because banks with a large branch 
network have access to low-cost deposit funding as compared to banks without the infrastructure 
to reach out to retail clients.  
 For hypothesis 3, we draw on the BEPS data for three proxies of policies that affect the 
level of information asymmetries within the bank. The first two proxies indicate whether (i) 
banks use information from a credit bureau and (ii) whether they use an internal credit ratings 
system. We think of these practices as routines that reduce the need for local information and 
thus for host-country executives. The final proxy is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the maximum 
size of a loan that can be approved by branch managers is less than the country level median.
9
 
The higher the loan size, the less stringent internal routines are, and thus the more likely it should 
be that banks appoint host-country executives. 
 At the level of executives, we control for their gender, their education (a dummy 
indicating whether they have a master’s degree and a dummy indicating if information on 
education is available) and four dummies to indicate that they are the CEO, a finance/risk officer, 
                                                 
9
 This dummy can also be seen as a measure of the hierarchical nature of the internal organization or the level of 
decentralization (Degryse, et al., 2009, Canales and Nanda, 2012). 
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an operations officer or a sales officer. At the bank level, we control for size (log of assets and 
log of assets squared) and for the number of years under foreign ownership. In addition, we 
include a dummy to indicate that a bank was established as a greenfield bank. Greenfield banks 
are often smaller than acquired banks and also tend to have a narrower mandate with a focus on 
e.g. corporate banking or home-based clients. At the country level, we control for the log of GDP 
per capita, which is a proxy for demand conditions but is also highly correlated with the general 
business climate (Commander and Svejnar, 2011). In addition, we include GDP growth and the 
ratio of bank credit to GDP as controls. The former is another proxy for demand conditions and 
the latter a proxy for the development of the banking sector. Finally, we include two dummies 
for French and Socialist legal origins in the model (the omitted category is German). Legal 
origins guide the development of the institutional framework for business transactions including 
contract law and conflict resolution (LaPorta, LopezDeSilanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
 
4. Results 
The first set of regressions relates the appointment of executives to the quality of institutions the 
host country. The first column includes only the control variables and shows that female 
executives and sales executives are less likely to be from the parent country, which was already 
apparent from Tables 1 and 2. Large banks are less likely to appoint parent-country executives, 
although the positive coefficient on log assets squared implies that the effect of size shrinks 
when banks get larger. Parent-country executives are also seen less in countries with well-
developed credit markets. The other control variables are insignificant and generally remain so 
after we include the institutional variables. 
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 In the second and third columns, we enter the bribery indicators to the equation. As 
anticipated, higher perceived levels of bribery are associated with an increase in the likelihood 
that owners appoint parent-country executives. The results in columns 4 and 5 reinforce this: 
higher ICRG ratings (higher ratings mean lower risk) are associated with a drop in appointments 
of parent-country executives. However, better creditor rights are associated with an increase in 
the likelihood that parent-country executives are appointed. Better creditor rights also have a 
positive effect, but the coefficient is insignificant in this case. 
 In Table 5, we re-estimate the model by executive function (to save space, we omit the 
coefficients on the control variables from the table). The results indicate that both an increase in 
bribery and a worsening of ICRG risk ratings are associated with the appointment of parent-
country CEOs (the p-value of the coefficient in panel A, column 1 is 0.11). The appointment of 
parent-country executives in finance and risk functions becomes less likely when the ICRG score 
for bureaucracy quality increases. According to the ICRG methodology, higher scores imply that 
policies and regulation are more stable so that there are fewer financial risks from changes in 
regulation. The coefficients in column 4 reveal that the appointment of parent-country executives 
in sales functions is an important driver of the positive association between parent-country 
executives and improvements in creditor rights. 
 We report the results of several robustness tests in Table 6. Panel A repeats the 
estimations of Table 4, but in a logit specification. All coefficients on the institutional variables 
are of the same sign and they are of similar significance. In panel B, we restrict the sample to 
newly appointed executives only. This reduces our sample size by more than 80 percent. In spite 
of this, all coefficients keep their signs and the coefficients on bribery in the courts and on 
bureaucracy quality remain significant. Finally, in Panel C, we use a categorical variable that 
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“rewards” host-country executives for international experience. The underlying assumption is 
that international work or educational experience facilitates communication between host-
country executives and foreign owners and thus makes these executives more useful in their roles 
as monitor on behalf of the parent. Again, the estimates confirm the results from Table 4. 
  
Parent-country executives and strategy 
In Table 7, we report the results of the regressions of parent-country executive appointments on 
bank strategy. In the first three columns, we use the proxies for retail orientation as measures of 
strategy. All three coefficients are negative as expected, and in two out of three cases they are 
significant. Regressions in alternative specifications (Table 8, columns 1 to 3) show that in 
particular the coefficient on % Loans to households, which is probably the best proxy for the 
agency problems that arise as a result of a retail focus, is robust. 
 In columns 4 to 7, we use our measures for routines as strategy variables. The 
coefficients are all positive as expected and the coefficients on the branch manager’s approval 
limit as well as the routines dummy are both significant. We cannot tell with certainty, of course, 
why the other coefficients are not significant, but it may simply be the case that there is 
insufficient variation: 85 % of the banks in our sample use credit scoring and 77 % use 
information from credit bureaus. The coefficients on the approval limit and on the routines 
dummy are also significant in a logit specification, and also when we limit the sample to newly 
appointed executives (Table 8, Panels A and B, columns 6 and 7). 
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Further analysis 
So far, we have found that improvements in the general business environment and a drop in 
perceived corruption are associated with fewer appointments of parent-country executives. At the 
same time, improvements in creditor rights, institutions that are specific to the credit market, are 
associated with an increase in appointments of parent-country executives. Furthermore, we found 
that banks with a retail orientation are likely to appoint host-country executives, while banks that 
restrict the authority of their branch managers are more likely to appoint parent-country 
executives. 
 These results are in line with our hypotheses except for the positive relationship between 
creditor rights and the appointment of parent-country executives. We anticipated that, because 
creditor rights reduce information asymmetries, they would reduce the need for monitoring and 
therefore the need for parent-country executives – this appears not to be the case. 
 There are two possible explanations for this result. To begin with, it could be the case that 
better creditor rights give a bank leeway to pursue clients that would be too opaque or risky 
without secure creditor rights. In that case, a change in strategy in response to better creditor 
rights negates any reduction of agency problems that results from better creditor rights, or even 
reverses the effect. If this is true, we would expect that an improvement in creditor rights has a 
larger impact on executive appointments in banks with a strong focus on opaque clients such as 
retail clients. We investigate this in Table 9, Panel A, where we estimate a model that includes 
creditor rights, a measure of retail orientation and, in one specification, an interaction between 
the two. The table shows that the coefficient on % loans to households and on Deposits / Loans 
are significant, just like in Table 7. The coefficient on creditor rights loses its significance in the 
first four columns. However, we checked and found that this is due to the reduction in sample 
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size, not the inclusion of the strategy variables. The interaction between retail focus and creditor 
rights is never significant, so we find no support for the hypothesis that the positive coefficient 
on creditor rights is due to changes in strategy that coincide with better creditor rights. 
 An alternative explanation for the positive coefficient on creditor rights is that weak 
creditor rights cause agency problems within the subsidiary, but not between the subsidiary and 
the parent. As long as the loan portfolio is large and diverse enough, weak creditor rights may 
raise the expected default rate but need not affect uncertainty expected default rates. The foreign 
owner can then essentially treat the executives of a bank as delegated monitors (Diamond, 1984).  
In this case, host-country executives are well-placed to address an increase in asymmetric 
information between loan officers and the management of the subsidiary that arises due to weak 
creditor rights. By contrast, ambiguity about general regulatory frameworks and corrupt courts 
and regulators generates uncertainty about portfolio risk. Foreign owners respond to this type of 
uncertainty by sending parent-country executives as supervisors. 
We further investigate this in Panel B of Table 9, where we combine indicators of overall 
institutional quality with those of credit institutions. By and large, the coefficients on the ICRG 
scores remain significant in these regressions. Where they do not, it is by a small margin only. In 
columns 1 and 2, the p-values are 0.103 and 0.115 respectively. The coefficients on credit 
institutions however are never significant (the lowest p-value, in column 1, is 0.139) and the 
interactions are not significant either. These results imply that the impact of the general business 
climate, which affects the level of information asymmetries between parent and subsidiary, on 
the appointment of parent-country executives dominates that of institutions that are specific to 
the credit market and affect information asymmetries within the subsidiary. 
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5. Conclusion 
We investigate how foreign owners of banks in emerging markets use their power to appoint 
executives at their subsidiaries to manage agency problems in the parent-subsidiary relationship. 
We find that banks with a focus on retail clients are more likely to have host-country executives, 
who understand the local environment. Similarly, banks that do not have strong organizational 
routines are more likely to have host-country executives, who are also better placed to deal with 
information asymmetries between managers and loan officers. Banks that operate in institutional 
environments that are poor in general are more likely to appoint parent-country executives. By 
contrast, poor creditor rights are associated with the appointment of fewer parent-country 
executives. 
These results are important in the context of research on the impact of hierarchical 
decision making on lending behavior (Stein, 2002, Degryse, et al., 2009, Liberti and Mian, 
2009). Specifically, institutional and organizational characteristics that cause agency problems 
within a bank need not create agency problems between a bank and its owner. Further research 
should determine whether this can explain why some researchers find that foreign-owned banks 
are reluctant to engage in retail lending while other find the opposite (Mian, 2006, De Haas, et 
al., 2010). 
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Table 1 Parent Country Executives 
Executive Title 
Observations % Parent 
country 
  New 
Appointments 
% Parent 
country 
Chief Executive Officer   339 41.0%      54 53.7% 
Deputy CEO    85 48.2%      13 61.5% 
Finance/Risk Function   380 48.2%      79 58.2% 
Operations/IT/HR   267 33.0%      57 42.1% 
Sales Function   607 24.5%     116 30.2% 
Legal Officer    35 20.0%       7 42.9% 
Unspecified / General   301 46.5%      30 63.3% 
Total 2,014 37.1% 
 
  356 46.1% 
Notes Parent country executives are all executives that do not come from the country where a 
bank is located, except if the executive is from Slovakia and the bank is in the Czech Republic 
and vice versa or if both the executive and the bank are from one of the former Yugoslav 
Republics (Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia). Source: own research from bank websites and 
annual reports. 
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Table 2: Executive Characteristics 
  Obs. Median Mean St. Dev Min Max 
Panel A: Host-country Executives           
Age   505 43 43.67  7.70 28 69 
1 if Female 1,267  0  0.20  0.40  0  1 
1 if Master’s Degree 1,002  1  0.70  0.46  0  1 
1 if Foreign work experience 1,267  0  0.17  0.38  0  1 
1 if Foreign Education 1,002  0  0.29  0.46  0  1 
Years in Executive Position 1,106  2  3.79  4.03  0 21 
Years in Board of Directors 1,084  3  4.55  4.49  0 23 
Years in Subsidiary 1,047  8  8.87  6.94  0 39 
Years in Parent Company 1,077  7  6.82  4.22  0 24 
Panel B: Parent-country Executives           
Age   315 46 46.50  7.77 31 67 
1 if Female   747  0  0.05  0.23  0  1 
1 if Master’s Degree   584  1  0.64  0.48  0  1 
1 if Foreign work experience   746  1  0.58  0.49  0  1 
1 if Foreign Education   584  0  0.39  0.49  0  1 
Years in Executive Position   640  2  2.18  2.26  0 11 
Years in Board of Directors   642  2  2.48  2.36  0 11 
Years in Subsidiary   630  2  3.23  2.93  0 16 
Years in Parent Company   614  9 11.52  9.26  0 40 
Notes  Parent country executives are all executives that do not come from the country where a 
bank is located, except if the executive is from Slovakia and the bank is in the Czech Republic and 
vice versa or if both the executive and the bank are from one of the former Yugoslav Republics 
(Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia). Source: own research from bank websites and annual reports. 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max Source 
1 if Parent-country executive 1,893   0.37   0.48   0.00   1.00 Own research 
1 if Newly appointed Parent-country executive   334   0.46   0.50   0.00   1.00 Own research 
1 if Foreign education 1,893   0.27   0.44   0.00   1.00 Own research 
1 if Foreign work experience 1,893   0.32   0.47   0.00   1.00 Own research 
1 if No work history available 1,893   0.00   0.02   0.00   1.00 Own research 
Regulator prone to bribery 1,893   1.38   0.71   1.00   3.63 EBRD (BEPS Survey) 
Court prone to bribery 1,893   1.80   1.02   1.00   5.00 EBRD (BEPS Survey) 
ICRG: Comprehensive risk rating 1,889  71.88   4.94  60.20  79.20 ICRG 
ICRG: Bureaucracy quality 1,889   2.46   0.76   1.00   3.00 ICRG 
Creditor rights index 1,893   7.41   1.32   4.00   9.00 Doing Business 
Credit information index 1,893   4.01   1.51   0.00   6.00 Doing Business 
% of Loans to consumers 1,157  31.33  18.11   0.00  76.96 EBRD (BEPS Survey) 
% of Deposits from consumers 1,039  51.62  16.86   0.00  85.00 EBRD (BEPS Survey) 
Deposits / Loans 1,624   1.02   0.55   0.21   3.76 Bankscope 
1 if Bank uses internal credit scoring 1,132   0.85   0.36   0.00   1.00 EBRD (BEPS Survey) 
1 if Using credit bureau 1,294   0.77   0.42   0.00   1.00 EBRD (BEPS Survey) 
1 if Branch manager approval limit is low 1,009   0.40   0.49   0.00   1.00 EBRD (BEPS Survey) 
1 if Routines important   928   0.24   0.43   0.00   1.00 EBRD (BEPS Survey) 
1 if Female 1,893   0.14   0.35   0.00   1.00 Own research 
1 if Master's degree or higher 1,893   0.53   0.50   0.00   1.00 Own research 
1 if Education not available 1,893   0.22   0.41   0.00   1.00 Own research 
1 if Chief Executive Officer 1,893   0.17   0.37   0.00   1.00 Own research 
1 if Finance/Risk Executive 1,893   0.19   0.39   0.00   1.00 Own research 
1 if Operations/IT/HR Executive 1,893   0.13   0.34   0.00   1.00 Own research 
1 if Sales Executive 1,893   0.30   0.46   0.00   1.00 Own research 
log Assets 1,893  10.56   2.74   4.86  17.67 Bankscope 
log Assets squared 1,893 118.96  64.03  23.59 312.09 Bankscope 
log of Years under foreign ownership 1,893   2.35   0.63   0.00   4.17 Own research 
Foreign greenfield 1,893   0.29   0.46   0.00   1.00 Own research 
log GDP per capita 1,893   9.69   0.31   8.74  10.16 World Bank 
GDP growth (annual %) 1,893   2.90   5.90 - 17.95  12.23 World Bank 
Bank credit / GDP 1,893  60.43  16.74  20.76 106.24 World Bank 
1 if Legal origin is Socialist 1,893   0.06   0.24   0.00   1.00 Djankov et al. (2007) 
1 if Legal origin is French 1,893   0.18   0.38   0.00   1.00 Djankov et al. (2007) 
Notes 1 if Foreign education and 1 if Foreign work experience are equal to 1 if an executive had worked or studied outside of 
his country of origin before accepting his or her current position. The scores for Regulator prone to bribery and Court prone to 
bribery are country level averages of responses to a question whether regulators or the courts were likely to accept bribes (7 
point scale). 1 if Branch manager approval limit is low is equal to 1 if the maximum loan size that can be approved by branch 
managers is below the country-level median.  1 if Routines important is equal to 1 if the dummies 1 if Using credit bureau, 1 if 
Bank uses internal credit scoring and 1 if Branch manager approval limit is low are all equal to 1. The number of observations 
in this table differs from that in Tables 1 and 2 because the table only includes observations for which executive, bank 
accounting and country-level control variables are available. 
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Table 4: Institutions and parent country executives 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Regulator prone to bribery 0.000 0.147* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  0.000 [0.085] 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Court prone to bribery 0.000 0.000 0.123** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  0.000 0.000 [0.055] 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ICRG: Comprehensive risk rating 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.015** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 [0.007] 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ICRG: Bureaucracy quality 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.263*** 0.000 0.000 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 [0.063] 0.000 0.000 
Creditor rights index 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.034** 0.000 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 [0.017] 0.000 
Credit information index 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.013 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 [0.013] 
1 if Female -0.273*** -0.274*** -0.268*** -0.281*** -0.273*** -0.262*** -0.272*** 
  [0.054] [0.053] [0.053] [0.054] [0.054] [0.054] [0.054] 
1 if Master's degree or higher -0.059 -0.076 -0.081 -0.067 -0.085 -0.071 -0.065 
  [0.067] [0.068] [0.068] [0.068] [0.067] [0.066] [0.067] 
1 if Education not available 0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 -0.013 0.004 0.003 
  [0.070] [0.069] [0.070] [0.070] [0.069] [0.070] [0.070] 
1 if Chief Executive Officer -0.046 -0.043 -0.040 -0.041 -0.031 -0.039 -0.047 
  [0.061] [0.061] [0.061] [0.061] [0.062] [0.061] [0.061] 
1 if Finance/Risk Executive 0.063 0.065 0.065 0.067 0.075 0.067 0.060 
  [0.058] [0.058] [0.058] [0.057] [0.057] [0.058] [0.058] 
1 if Operations/IT/HR Executive -0.071 -0.070 -0.068 -0.071 -0.069 -0.068 -0.072 
  [0.077] [0.076] [0.076] [0.077] [0.077] [0.078] [0.077] 
1 if Sales Executive -0.175*** -0.170*** -0.166*** -0.175*** -0.161*** -0.168*** -0.177*** 
  [0.050] [0.050] [0.050] [0.050] [0.051] [0.050] [0.050] 
Continued next page 
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Table 4 Continued 
log Assets -0.104** -0.082** -0.080* -0.102** -0.092** -0.078* -0.095** 
  [0.042] [0.040] [0.041] [0.043] [0.043] [0.041] [0.040] 
log Assets squared 0.004** 0.003** 0.003** 0.004** 0.004** 0.003** 0.004** 
  [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
log of Years under foreign ownership 0.086 0.078 0.086 0.075 0.055 0.087 0.079 
  [0.063] [0.063] [0.061] [0.061] [0.059] [0.062] [0.062] 
Foreign greenfield -0.127 -0.107 -0.117 -0.124 -0.109 -0.129 -0.116 
  [0.098] [0.096] [0.097] [0.097] [0.093] [0.097] [0.097] 
log GDP per capita -0.130 0.082 0.102 0.022 0.255* -0.087 -0.144 
  [0.156] [0.174] [0.170] [0.147] [0.150] [0.156] [0.156] 
GDP growth (annual %) -0.003 -0.003 -0.004** 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Bank credit / GDP -0.004* -0.005** -0.006*** -0.006** -0.005** -0.003 -0.003 
  [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
1 if Legal origin is Socialist 0.071 -0.057 -0.092 0.117 -0.033 0.059 0.083 
  [0.185] [0.212] [0.206] [0.178] [0.174] [0.185] [0.181] 
1 if Legal origin is French 0.008 0.064 0.025 -0.073 -0.283** 0.044 -0.010 
  [0.085] [0.091] [0.077] [0.101] [0.109] [0.074] [0.089] 
Constant 2.397* 0.110 -0.072 2.188 -0.564 1.552 2.441* 
  [1.431] [1.640] [1.587] [1.368] [1.289] [1.407] [1.425] 
Observations 1,890 1,890 1,890 1,886 1,886 1,890 1,890 
R-squared 0.104 0.111 0.116 0.111 0.133 0.110 0.105 
Notes The dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if an executive is from the parent country of the bank. Standard 
errors, clustered by bank, in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5: Institutions and parent country executives 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Executive role (dependent variable):    Chief 
Executive 
Finance / 
Risk 
Operations / 
IT / HR 
Sales 
Panel A         
Regulator prone to bribery 0.270 0.056 0.207 0.110 
  [0.168] [0.146] [0.231] [0.122] 
Panel B         
Court prone to bribery 0.222** 0.104 0.126 0.103 
  [0.103] [0.097] [0.125] [0.066] 
Panel C         
ICRG: Comprehensive risk rating -0.024* -0.020 0.005 -0.009 
  [0.013] [0.012] [0.017] [0.010] 
Panel E         
ICRG: Bureaucracy quality -0.341** -0.356*** -0.069 -0.213** 
  [0.143] [0.127] [0.165] [0.096] 
Panel F         
Creditor rights index 0.015 0.078* -0.006 0.050** 
  [0.037] [0.040] [0.044] [0.021] 
Panel G         
Credit information index 0.023 -0.004 -0.036 0.038** 
  [0.034] [0.040] [0.038] [0.018] 
Notes The dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if an executive is from the parent 
country of the bank. All regressions include the control variables listed in Table 4. Standard 
errors, clustered by bank, in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** 
significant at 1% 
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Table 6: Institutions and parent country executives 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Institutional variable:    
Bribery 
regulator 
Bribery 
court 
ICRG: Comp. 
risk rating 
ICRG: Bur. 
Qual. Creditor rights 
Credit 
information 
Panel A: parent-country executives (logit estimation)  
Institutions 0.713* 0.590** -0.073** -1.329*** 0.170* 0.064 
  [0.412] [0.272] [0.035] [0.400] [0.090] [0.070] 
Observations 1,890 1,890 1,886 1,886 1,890 1,890 
Pseudo R-squared 0.091 0.095 0.091 0.111 0.091 0.086 
Panel B: Newly appointed executives (linear regression)       
Institutions 0.121 0.126* -0.011 -0.262*** 0.018 0.000 
  [0.108] [0.069] [0.012] [0.086] [0.027] [0.022] 
Observations 325 325 324 324 325 325 
R-squared 0.146 0.152 0.150 0.171 0.144 0.142 
Panel C: Hybrid nationalities (ordered logit estimation)       
Institutions 0.557 0.558** -0.067** -1.047*** 0.240*** 0.036 
  [0.359] [0.227] [0.030] [0.274] [0.077] [0.066] 
Observations 1,890 1,890 1,886 1,886 1,890 1,890 
Pseudo R-squared 0.050 0.054 0.052 0.060 0.056 0.048 
Notes The reported coefficients are the coefficients on the institutional variable (by column) in a regression of three different 
dependent variables (by panel) on institutions and control variables. In Panel A, the dependent variable is a dummy that is equal 
to 1 if an executive is from the parent country of the bank. In Panel B, the dependent variable is a dummy variable that is equal 
to 1 if a newly appointed executive is from the parent country. In Panel C, the dependent variable is a categorical variable that is 
equal to 3 if an executive is from the parent country of the bank, equal to 2 if the executive is from the host country but has 
international work experience and equal to 1 if the executive is from the host country and has had formal international 
education. All regressions include the control variables listed in Table 4. In panel B, the regression also includes the share of 
incumbent executives that is from the parent country and in panel C. Standard errors, clustered by bank, in parentheses. * 
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
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Table 7: Strategy and parent country executives 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) (7) 
  Retail focus   Routines 
% of Loans to consumers -0.004*** 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  [0.001] 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
% of Deposits from consumers 0.000 -0.001 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  0.000 [0.002] 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Deposits / Loans 0.000 0.000 -0.067*   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  0.000 0.000 [0.039]   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1 if Bank uses internal credit scoring 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.052 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  0.000 0.000 0.000   [0.076] 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1 if Using credit bureau 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.138 0.000 0.000 
  0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 [0.089] 0.000 0.000 
1 if Branch manager approval limit is low 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.152** 0.000 
  0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 [0.062] 0.000 
1 if Routines important 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.146* 
  0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 [0.073] 
Observations 1,154 1,036 1,622   1,129 1,291 1,006 925 
R-squared 0.136 0.126 0.113   0.101 0.106 0.109 0.091 
Notes The dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if an executive is from the parent country of the bank. Standard 
errors, clustered by bank, in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
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Table 8: Institutions and parent country executives 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Strategy variable:    % Loans to 
consumers 
% Deposits fr. 
consumers 
Deposits / 
Loans 
Using credit 
scoring 
Using credit 
bureau 
Approval 
limit low 
Routines 
important 
Panel A: parent-country executives (logit estimation)       
 Strategy -0.025*** -0.008 -0.332 0.237 0.718 0.734** 0.675* 
  [0.009] [0.011] [0.212] [0.378] [0.503] [0.315] [0.348] 
Observations 1,154 1,036 1,622 1,129 1,291 1,006 925 
Pseudo R-squared 0.116 0.105 0.092 0.082 0.089 0.093 0.076 
Panel B: Newly appointed executives (linear regression)       
 Strategy -0.007*** -0.007 -0.093 0.197** 0.163 0.272*** 0.330*** 
  [0.002] [0.004] [0.058] [0.096] [0.130] [0.094] [0.105] 
Observations 175 157 272 184 207 160 147 
R-squared 0.208 0.228 0.175 0.178 0.172 0.194 0.186 
Panel C: Hybrid nationalities (ordered logit estimation)       
 Strategy -0.016** -0.006 -0.207 0.398 0.639 0.486 0.517 
  [0.007] [0.010] [0.176] [0.337] [0.408] [0.334] [0.403] 
Observations 1,154 1,036 1,622 1,129 1,291 1,006 925 
Pseudo R-squared 0.062 0.058 0.051 0.047 0.054 0.051 0.045 
Notes The reported coefficients are the coefficients on the strategy variable (by column) in a regression of three different dependent 
variables (by panel) on institutions and control variables. In Panel A, the dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if an 
executive is from the parent country of the bank. In Panel B, the dependent variable is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a 
newly appointed executive is from the parent country. In Panel C, the dependent variable is a categorical variable that is equal to 3 
if an executive is from the parent country of the bank, equal to 2 if the executive is from the host country but has international work 
experience and equal to 1 if the executive is from the host country and has had formal international education. All regressions 
include the control variables listed in Table 4. In panel B, the regression also includes the share of incumbent executives that is 
from the parent country and in panel C. Standard errors, clustered by bank, in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 
5%, *** significant at 1% 
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Table 9: Institutions, strategy, and parent country executives 
Panel A: Retail focus (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)     
Retail focus:    % Loans to consumers % Deposits fr. consumers Deposits / Loans   
Creditor rights index 0.013 0.032 0.020 0.011 0.043* 0.042*     
  [0.020] [0.026] [0.022] [0.023] [0.022] [0.022]     
Retail orientation -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.075* -0.075*     
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.039] [0.040]     
Retail orientation x Bureaucracy 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 -0.004     
  0.000 [0.001] 0.000 [0.002] 0.000 [0.042]     
Observations 1,150 1,150 1,036 1,036 1,618 1,618     
R-squared 0.142 0.143 0.135 0.137 0.135 0.135     
Panel B: Routines (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ICRG score:    Comprehensive risk rating Bureaucracy quality 
Credit institutions:    Creditor rights Credit information Creditor rights Credit information 
ICRG score -0.012 -0.012 -0.015** -0.015** -0.250*** -0.248*** -0.267*** -0.262*** 
  [0.007] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007] [0.071] [0.070] [0.066] [0.066] 
Credit institutions 0.027 0.026 0.005 0.006 0.010 0.008 -0.005 -0.009 
  [0.018] [0.018] [0.014] [0.014] [0.018] [0.019] [0.014] [0.017] 
Credit institutions x ICRG score 0.000 -0.005   0.001 0.000 -0.012   -0.013 
  0.000 [0.003]   [0.002] 0.000 [0.026]   [0.018] 
Observations 1,886 1,886 1,886 1,886 1,886 1,886 1886 1886 
R-squared 0.115 0.117 0.111 0.111 0.134 0.134 0.134 0.134 
Notes The dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if an executive is from the parent country of the bank. The estimates represent the 
coefficient on Creditor rights (Panel A) as well as Credit information (in Panel B), a measure of retail orientation (Panel A) and ICRG scores 
(panel B) and an interaction between the two. Creditor rights, Credit information, the variables pertaining to retail focus and the ICRG scores have 
been demeaned in order to reduce correlation in the regressions that contain an interaction term. Standard errors, clustered by bank, in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
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